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Followlng  ls  the  text  of
Tlmes  Revlew of  Industry,rl
an article  from
London,  January,  1959.
MOVES  TOUTARD  IIqTEcRATION
by
Professor t'Jalter Hatlstein
Presldent  of  the  commlsslon,  Buropean Economlc comnunity
Polltlcs  used to  be the art  of  the posslble,  when  one of  the
main alms of  government was to  preserve  the  status  quo.  Today,  it  mlght better  be describecr as  rhe  arr  oe  tte  ma*i.uiffif6E:  for  ioa"y,  *o"t governments recognlze  and eeek to  harness  the  oynanrrc  elements  lnvolved  irr their  taek,  eupplementlng the  bltnd  trende and iraditions  of  hletory  by
consclous efforts  to  thlnk  afresh.  Yet all  sueh  efforts  are stlll  of  neces-
eity  deeply affected  by the  tenslon  between the  |tmaximumrt  and the  nposslble,r,
between the  ldeallstlc  ancl  the pract{cal.
Thls dualiry,  famirlar  enough  ln other  flelds,  ts  partlcurarly
marked in  two of  the  maln movementg  ln  the  post-wer  free  world  -  on  the  one hand,  Ehe  move towards  freer  trade,  and,  on  the  other,  the  movement  for
European  integratlon.  Both are obvlously  lnter-related,  but  eeeentlally  dle-
ti'nct;  and both derlve  from an untldy  complex  of  hletorlcal  causee.  Brltatn, the  tradltlonal  hone of  emplrlclsrn,  iraa unttr  lately  been more partlcularly
assoclated  wlth  the  move towards  freer  trade  than wlth  the  movement  for
European  lntegratlon.  But,  paradoxlcally  enough, the  fonner is  more idealist{c,
and the  latter  more Practlcal,  than  theti  "uopl"itve  exponents very often 8ugge8t,.
The move towarde  freer  tntcrnatlonal  trade,  tt  need hardly  be sald,
hae taken  tr'ro  maln  forms  ln  the  postwar  world:  the  reductton  of  euetons
tarlffs,  chlefly  ln  G.A.T.T.1 6rd the renoval of  quant{tatlve  restrlctlone,
chlefly  ln  o.E.E.c.  Both G.A.T.T. and o.E.E.c.  aie of  course emplrlcal  and rrpractlcalil  ln  the  sense that  I  have clescrtbed.  Both, wlth  reapl"tfu"fy  fZ
and 17 members' are  in  some  aort  reglonal  organlzatlons;  both  have adopled
flexlble  rutee  of  procedure permitting,  ln  pirtlcular,  ihe  fonoatton  of
enaller  and tlghter  grouplnge,  such ae regtonal  customs unlone,  wlthln  thelr
ranks.  Both,  I  need hardly  acld, have remarkable  achlevements [o  thelr  credtt -  a  fact  whlch  ls  eometlnee gtven  leee  emphasis than  lt  deeerves by  those
who champlon rnore thoroughgolng  forrns of  internatlonal  cooperatlon-.  Both,
ftnally,  are I'practlcalf  tn  the  Benoe  that  they  set  themselvee llntted  ob-
Jectlves'  one deal.lng malnly  erlth tarlffe,  the other  nainly  wtth  quantltatlve
restrlctlone,  and both  etopplng  short  of  what hae come  to  be called  rreconomlc
integrattontr.
Neverthl-iesb,  tf  r  may be allowed  a  further  paradox,  it  ls  thle
very  llmltatlon  of  alm that  emphaslzee  what nay be called  the I'ldealLstic'l
68Pect of  both G.A.T.T.  and o.E.E.c.  Except tn  eo far  as both pernit  and
favor  the  foroatlon  of  emaller  grouplnge,  Loth  reepect  the  rule  of  the trmost-fgvored-natlonrr  clause,  wherely  l,l"tors  or  quota concesaions extended
by one member  State  to  another  are  al  the  eame  ttme offered  to  all  the  regt.
!9th'  therefore'  rePresent  a movement  towarde multltateral  free  trade,  whlch
if  tt  eould  be pursued  to  the  llmtt  would hlpothetically  result  in  the  renoval
on  the  one hend of  all  tariffs  and on  the  otler  of  all  quantttatlve  reetrlctLone
on  trade  between the  respectlve  member States.  Such sould  be  the  rfoax1mrmn:
but  even ln  thls  hypothetical  Lnstance  the  ilposelblett  would  intervene  ln  three
nays-  Flret,  becauee tarlffs  and quotas  would be handled  eeparately  by  two
dlfferent  grouplngs of  Statea,
ii:,
1If  G.A.T.T.,  for  exarnple,_were  to  succeed  ln  reducing  all  tarlfts  to  zero, rhe  problem  of  quotea  mlght  etltl  ;;;;i.;  whtte  tf  O.B.E.C.  oere  ro  achleve I'oo  per  cent  riberarlzatlon  from  quaritrtatr.ve  restrr-ctrons,  not  onry  mlght thts  leave rhe rarrff  probrem  to be serrrea rn c.a.i:i:;";,1.  1r would  areo mean  that in respect  of  quotas  certaln C.A.T.T.  membere  would  be dlscriml_ nating  against  their  partners.
-  Secondly, the hypothet{cal  state  of  affalrs  dhus achleved, in  so far  as 1t  rvas  self-consistenE,  would somewhatreeenblc  acustoms unlon without a conmon  external  tariff.  A *free-tra<le  arear,ot  this  sort  has hltherto  only been achleved,  and that  provisionarly,  between Nlcaragua  and san sarvador, in  1951.  Even  with  further  safeguaris  and provi"os,  it  presenta  innumerable
difflculties,  as Lhe paris  negoriatlons  have shorrn.  But a third  and final
qrob_lem,  for  our  hypothetical  ldear,  is  thaE in  the ex!.stlng  structure  of
G.A.T.T.  and O.E.E.C._  there  is  no provision  for  the  eventual  freelng  of trade  Eo be lrrevErstble,  and no explrclt  and brnding  conmrtment to  the
coordination  of  national  policles  which  the  achlevemlnt  of  the  ldeal  would surely  necessitate.
In  these  ways,  then,  I  think  it  may be  sald  $ri.thout dlsparagement
or  dlsrespecc  that  'rfree  trade"  in  t.his  sense is  less  practical  and rnore "tdealiscic"  a goal  than  the  substantial  progress  made towards  it  might
suggest.  To say thls-is  not,  of  course,  to  deny the very  great  value of  the
mutual  benefits  that  have been achieved,  and a.e  bulng  achieved,  in  both
c.A.T.T.  and o.E.E.c.  Both, moreover, are clearly  cafable  of  further  evolu-
tion  and closer  forms of  cooperaEion,  But  it  cannot  be denled,  r  think,  that
the  post-war  move for  freer  lrade,  as exenpllfied  in  both  of  them,  ehows
thac  characterlstic  blend  of  loglc  and lllcgic,  of  Ehe "maxlmumtt  and the "possiblet',  that  ls  lnseparabre  from human  politicar  arrangements.
The post-''rar  movement for  European lntegratlon,  ln  contrasc,  may
6eem  at  flr8t  sight  a  far  more consistent  ideal,  and perhaps a  less praltlcal
gl".  rn  the_-flrsL place,  lt  has a clear-cut  political  motlve,  as the word rrlntegratlontt  may imply.  The second ldorld  tlar,  for  many continental  Buropeans,
seemed  an  indlctment  of  nationallsm:  at  dlfferent  time6  during  the  war all
six  community countrles  suffered  defeat  an<l  invaslon.  Their  experience  was
ln  marked contrast  to  that  of  Brltain,  for  whom  these  same  years  ln  some
sense vlndicated  the  natlonal  prlnciple  and emphaslzed the  lmportance  of
the  Channel dlvlding  her  from  the  Contlnent.
rt  may even be  that  the  s{mpre  fact  of  having  to  take  a boat  or
an aeroplane  ln  order  to  go abroad hae more than  symbollc  slgnlflcance.  At
all  events,  lt  was conti.nental  Europeans who saw most clearly  the  pollttcal
dangers of  a  fragrnented or  ttBalkanlzed,r Burope at  a  time  when the  centre  of
gravlty  wae ehifting  atray from  the  old  world  and becomlng polarized  in  Eaet
and l'lest.  rt  wa8 lmportant,  ln  thelr  vlew,  not  to  6et  up a  so-called  ,thlrd
force"  in  Europe,  but  rather  to  insure  that  Europe ehouli  be a  strong  end
unlted  partner  ln  the  Atlantlc  alliance.
The ldeal  of  an eventual  European federatlon  therefore,  hag more
force  on  the  Contlnent  than  is  sometlmes supposed.  But  it  has also  been
supported,  ln  the  post-war  perlod,  by many of  the  claeeical  economlc argu-
ments  for  freer  trade  -  the  need for  larger  and more stable  markets,  to  ald
expanglon,  new lnvestment,  and modernizatlon,  and the  calr  for  a higher
degree of  internatlonal  divlslon  of  labor  and the  formatlon  of  optinrum
productive  units.  study  of  these  obJectlves,  and some  practical  experlenee
of  thern ln  the  European  coal  and  steel  conrnunlty,  hae  led  to  the  conclusion
that  something more than  free  trade  ln  the  claselcal  eense le  neceseery  ro
reach  them -  or,  to  put  it  another  !ray.  that  free  trade  wlll  remaln  an ideal
unless  fairly  poeitlve  Jolnt  measures are  taken  to  achleve  and malntaln  it.
Thie  lnvolves  eomethlng more than  lalesez-faire  liberallsm,  but  some-
thing  lese  than  dlrlgisne:  lt  ls  not  eo much a compromise between them
as  a  new forn  of  economic  organizatlon  -  economlc  integratlon  by means
of  a  conmon market.
Freedom  of  Movement.
A comnon market  lmplies  more  than  siruply  the  removal  of  tarlffe,
or  even the  llberalizatlon  and ellmlnatlon  of  quotas.  It  also  lmplles  a
conmon  external  tariff.  In  thls,  lt  resembles a customa union;  but  it
goes  even  farther  than  that.  For  the  changlng  nature  of  the  nation  atate
and of  the  world  economy ln  general  has  meant  that  at  the  Bresent  time
natlonal  governments  posaess  many more  economic  tool8  or  weapons than
the  tradltlonal  tnstruments  of  pollcy  supplted  by  tarlffo  end quotas.
There woul.d be  llttte  potnt  ln  renovlRg  such elaseiedl  batrler8  to  free
trade  lf  other  equlvalent  barrlero  to  the  movenent  of  goode,  persons,
servl.cee,  and  capltal  were  not  to  be  dlenantled  at  the  same tlne.
:;:r!::ltia.::,::  .  -  ..
_.:.!  :::::j:-:;:::  E=:i:jdivlde  the  market  or  eerrouerv  r"-Ji"tiit  conpetrrlon;  and rr  would be un- reasonable  to  expect- enterprl;e'  t"  make the  neceasery tnvestmenta  and modernl- zatlons  to  exploit  the  ad-vintag."-ot"'"'-i.rger  tradrng  area  1f  there  were etlrr the  danger  that  one day  the  Uairi.eie  ,f!ha  go up once again.  For  the6e  reasons, a common  market  must be conprehenelve,  Ind  it  ..rst  Ue fireversiUfe.  ftrrther_ more'  it  must be rntroduced  gr"a".irlj  io  gtrre  the  natronsl  economres time  to adju6t  themselves;  and 1t.*uit  rut.-iioJr"ron  for  the  speclar  problems of
::o::i::.1:ped 
reglons  and for  ,"y  "i"ui"g  technologtcai  unemproyment.  Finally, ln  order  to  insure  fair  ancr  demcciatic  supervision  of  these  changes, as rvell  as to  insure  their  pennanence, there  must be conmon  lnstitutions  capabre of elaborating  common  rrorictes,  .";  r;;;;";  to  a degree of  common  democrari.c and judiciai  control.  ittu eventual  .itm ie  integ:ration,  therefore,  will  take the form of  someEhing, in  the  ""ono*i"-'-"f,i"i",  .ru.y  liice  a  federatron  of  states.
Such then 
1: 
.l:-ld:.-I,  the  phllosophy,  of  European inregrarion -  of  necesslty  over-Blmplified  ly  tti"'aummary,  but more or  ress complete, loglcal,  and in  a high  i"gr"e  poirri"ir.  But  iilte  all  rdesrs  rhis,  roo,  ls a "maxlmum"  rvhich in  p.""iicu  i"  n""u"ra"i15,  s.raiai.cned by the,,possibler,. rn  the  first  piace,  llke  the  post-war-move  tlr,rards  freer  tiade,  the  ii-:tegra- tion  noverne't  is  rtseLf  the  somer,rhat  untrdy  product  of  historicar  clrcum- stances.  Perhaps frrst.h{nted  at  by the  Briand proposals  of. L92g, it  found no concrete  expresslon  untlr  the  schuman  decraratlon  oi  isso,  and was thus  first tested  in  a singre  economic  sector,  that. of  coar and steel,  where its  l0glc was pei:haps most obvious.  But  it  would  be idle  to  deny that  many add{tional polltical  anc economic forces  contributed  Eo the creation  of  the coal  and steel ccrnnunlty,  and that  its.banic  phtlosophy  wriri rn  some  measure an  ex__wilgcto. developnenL,  and one r,rhlcrr  has u.rotr.i-consrderabry  slnce  r.950  or  even 1952. rnitlally  checked by  the  fallure  of  the  proposed Eirropean Detense conrrnunity and Buropean Politlcar_  comnrunity, t,-rrttur  steps  in  integration  have taken  a sllght1y  drfferent  path;  and,  .n'partlcular,-the  princlple  of  rntegraclon  by aecEors,  as exemplifled  in  the  Coal  and Steel  Community, has  largely  given  way to  that  of  global  tntegration,  as expressed  in  the  ruroiurr,  Economic communlty, although  in  the  special  field  of  atomic  por{er -  a comparatrve  tabura  rasa lt  contlnues  to  operate  in  the  shape of  Euratom.
qompromise  gn  Soverelgnfy.
If  the practlcal  plcture  is  thus  quallflecl  by the  ,,possible,r, the same ls  true  ln  the  instltutlonal  ephere 
-- in  the  spheie,  that  is,  of  'supra-
natlonalltyrr.  rn  a broader  6ense,  no doubt,  there  is  no'such  thlng  today  as a fully  soverergn  natlonal  srate;  y.t  o'  the  other  hil  ;;  !Jvern*"r,t  rs  as yer prepared  to  make an uncondltionai  surrender  of  tru  },igt-a!!ree  or  soverergnty that  lt  possesses.  The result,  rn  the various  community  lnstrtutlons,  la  a eertes  of  dlfferlne  compromrses, a  federar  balance  ;;-;;";;  rhat  wlL  undoubted- Iy  un<lergo further  evolution,  u"t  "ii.tt  at  present  remalns  ln  transltron.
The thlrd  sense in  whlch  the  rmaxrmumrr  of  European tntegratlon  ig quallfied  by  the  "possibler  ls,  ln  factr  its  geographical  lrmltation  to  the six'  Bven the  fact  that  it  ls  European is  in  thls  "".,r.  "  limrtatio.n,  lm- posed by circumstances  rather-than  Ly  volitlon.  The same ls  true,  of  course, of  the  various  moves tonards  freer  tiade;  but  llke  them the  comrlunity  ls  fully conscious  of  the  need to  look  outwards  -  a princrpie  not  only  confirmed  by  ttre practlce  of  the  coar  and steel  community but  reafiirrned  aiJ  ,naau law by  the Rome  Treatles  for  the  Dconomlc communrty and  Buratorn.  rn  thrs  sphere  also European lntegratron  ls  more flexlbre  und *oru  pragmatlc- trr"r, it  may at  flrst slght  eppear;  for  rohile  the  political  distlnctlon  6etween it  ana the  move for freer  trade  is  capital  and eLsential,  this  by-  no means i,nprr.u" incompatibility or  mutual  exclusiveness.  Both mevements, perhape,  have somethlng to  learn  from each other.  Freer  tracle may requlre,  as  r  have'tried  to  shor,  a hlgher  degree of  economic integration_;  bul  Burop""n  irrt.grotron,  for  1ts  part,  wirl  always geek to  promote  the  hlghest  possiLle  degree of  free  trade.
rn  dlscussing  the  contrasilng  but  related  phll0sophle6  0f  these  t$no novements,  r  have dellberately  refralnld  from  a a.tair"a-oilcusslon  of  the imroedlate-probLems posed_by-a European Economlc Assoclatron,  or  ,free  trade areatt.  The commlsslon  of  the  nuropean  Economrc community  rs  at  present  charged with  a-thoroughgoing  study  of  the  ways in  whlch  this  can be brought  about,  and
ff  youta  be borh  improper  and unhelpiul  ro  seek to  antrcipate  the  report  whlch lt  ha6 to  present  before  March l.
Aa r  wrlte'  the  practlcal  question  of  a provigl0nal  reglrne to  meet the fears  of  our  other  European partnera  on  the  occaslon  oi:[t.-Cornr,rnltyrs  first internal  tarlff  cuts  and.  quoia  enlargementa,  ls  still  under  discueslon.  But  r should  like  ro  concrude.bv  statlng  uiequtrro"airy-;;;;  i;;;  vrew and rhat  of  the cornnlselon  lt  ls  essentlal  that  tf,e  po"t-w"r  movefrent/for  European  integratlon -  both  ultlmately  atorng-at  econonlc  progress  and  the  etrengthenlng  of  the  free world  -  ehouLd  learn.to  rive-in  trarmony and  friendshtp  elde  by  srde  both  rn Europe  cnd  ln  the  wlder  world.
simllarly,"tj.'y::11  be qulte  i.nadequate to  renove euch public
:f:l::r::-.:-::::1.^1r_l:ly:::  ":"..;i;_.;,  monopouea  were  ro be auowed  to
llltlt  /  towarde  freer  trade  and  f.hc  movcmcrr
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